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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
No cases interpreting §30-3-10.6(2) of the Utah Code Annotated 
were found. 
STATUTES CITED 
§3 0-3-10.6(2) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has authority to hear this appeal pursuant to Article 
8 of the Constitution of the State of Utah; §78-2(3)(1) and §78-2a-3 
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; and, Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order signed by Judge James S. 
Sawaya of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
§30-3-10.6(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. DID JUDGE SAWAYA COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING 
TO MAKE A FINDING IN SUPPORT OF HIS DECISION TO DENY 
APPELLANT AN AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT FOR THE PERIOD OF 
TIME HER PETITION FOR MODIFICATION HAD BEENPENDING? 
II. DID THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL SUPPORT THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT TO DENY 
APPELLANT RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE INCREASE IN 
CHILD SUPPORT HE HAD JUST AWARDED? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were divorced in February, 1980. The findings of 
fact and conclusions of law published with the divorce decree state 
that at the time of the entry of the decree, the income of the 
respondent, a medial doctor, was in the amount of $77,03 0.54 per year. 
Based on a stipulation of the parties, entered into at the time of the 
divorce, the child support obligation of the respondent was set at 
$300.00 per child, per month. The respondent's alimony obligation to 
the appellant was further established at the amount of $900.00 per 
month. 
Three years later, appellant, believing that her former 
husband's income had increased dramatically and her needs for support 
having also increased, filed a petition for modification of the decree. 
She asked for an increase in the child support and alimony awards. 
In the process of litigating that petition for modification, 
Carol Brown, the appellant, was asked to agree to a settlement proposal 
and did. She later felt she should be relieved of that agreement. 
Judge Sawaya below determined that the appellant had entered into a 
binding agreement dispositive of her petition for modification. This 
lower court entered an order enforcing the terms of the settlement 
agreement, which was a final order terminating Carol's petition to 
modify. 
Carol Brown appealed. Her appeal was assigned to this honorable 
court as Case Number 860125-CA. In a decision dated December 18th, 
1987 and issued October 21, 1987, this court reversed the decision of 
Judge Sawaya stating that it was unfair to hold Carol to the terms of 
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the settlement agreement under the circumstances and remanded the case 
back for further proceedings (see Adendum B). 
Because of the delay on appeal, there were new and changed facts 
to be discovered. After additional discovery, the matter was tried on 
October 18th, 1988 before Judge Sawaya of the Third District Court. 
After taking the matter under advisement, the lower court issued 
its memorandum decision. Without making a finding in support thereof, 
Judge Sawaya declined to grant the appellant any increase in child 
support on a retroactive basis, even though her petition for 
modification had been on file since March 1, 1983 (a period of more 
than five years). A sum in excess of $33,000.00 was at stake, and 
there was statutory authority for such a retroactive award. It is from 
this decision of the Third District Court that Carol Brown brings this, 
her second appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ISSUE ONE 
The appellant maintains that the court below committed reversible 
error when it failed to make any finding whatsoever concerning her 
request for a retroactive increase in her child support award. The 
undisputed testimony presented at trial was to the effect that Dr. 
Brown had much more income when the petition was filed than he had at 
the time of the divorce. The undisputed testimony was specifically 
that Dr. Brown's income had gone from $70,000 at the time of the 
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decree, a year to over $150,000 each year for virtually all of the five 
years it took for Carol to get her petition heard (1983-1988). By the 
time of trial, the issue of whether of not Carol should have been 
granted child support increases retroactively to the day the petition 
was filed was at least a $33,000 issue. For the court to simply fail 
to make any finding on such a substantial issue is error of law. 
ISSUE TWO 
The evidence presented at that trial effecting the issue was 
circumstantial. It was that the respondent had the ability to make the 
increased child support payments all through the petition process (five 
and one half years with intervening appeal) . The evidence was also 
that Carol Brown had needed the increases all through that period. 
There was statutory authority for a retroactive award §30-3-10.6(2). 
It seems obvious from the final outcome that, but for the necessity of 
her interim appeal, Carol would have had the increases she ultimately 
won at an earlier date (what she got was an increase in total child 
support from $900.00 per month to $1,500.00 per month. For the court 
to refuse to give any retroactive application to the increases he 
awarded the appellant at trial, when it took her five and one half 
years to win it, is not equity and punishes her for her interim appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
DID JUDGE SAWAYA COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING 
TO MAKE A FINDING IN SUPPORT OF HIS DECISION TO DELAY THE 
APPELLANT AN AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT FOR THE PERIOD OF 
TIME HER PETITION FOR MODIFICATION HAD BEEN PENDING? 
Carol Brown asserts that the failure of the lower court to make 
a finding on this issue is reversible error. The parties were divorced 
in February, 1980. Carol Brown filed a petition for modification three 
years later, in 1983. Her petition was not tried until October of 
1988. Part of the reason it took five and one half years to get to 
trial was because Carol had to file an interim appeal. Judge Sawaya 
had previously terminated her petition, by enforcing a settlement 
agreement on her. Carol appealed. This court reversed, and remanded 
for trial. 
Carol Brown presented evidence at the time of trial in October 
of 1988 showing what had happened to her income, and what had happened 
to her former husband's income since the divorce. Although there were 
some questions concerning whether or not Dr. Brown should be allowed 
to deduct losses on investments from his income for child support 
purposes, the income figures were largely undisputed. 
A finding made at the time of the decree of divorce was that 
Dr. Brown then had income of $70,000 plus in 1980. The appellant was 
unemployed at that time and had no income. In subsequent years the 
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parties1 income, as established at the time of trial, was as outlined 
below: 
APPELLANT'S INCOME RESPONDENT'S INCOME 
1982 $1,911.00 1982 $123,187.00 
1983 .00 1983 160,628.36 
1984 .00 1984 146,079.08 
1985 1,985.00 1985 135,905.00 
1986 12,996.00 1986 70,750.00 
1987 14,127.46 1987 190,621.73 
The child support guide lines which were in effect at the time 
of trial, or about to go into effect, (Oct. 1988) suggested, based on 
the incomes outlined above, that the child support obligation of Dr. 
Brown be increased from $300.00 per child per month, for each of three 
children, to approximately $600.00 per child per month, or an increase 
in the total amount from $900.00 per month to $1,800.00 per month. In 
actuality, it was a little difficult to quote Judge Sawaya an accurate 
chart guide line because Dr. Brown's income was "off the charts". The 
charts that were in use in October of 1988 had no suggested figures for 
incomes greater than $10,000.00 per month gross. 
Judge Sawaya granted Carol an increase from $300.00 per child 
per month to $500.00 per child per month for a total of $1,500.00 per 
month. 
With the exception of 1986, Dr. Brown's income had been "off the 
charts" during the entire time period the petition had been pending. 
It is reasonable for appellant to assume that she would have been 
10 
awarded the increase she got in October of 1988 at a trial on the 
issues held any time earlier. 
The difference between Dr. Brown's child support obligation in 
the 1980 decree of $900.00 per month, and the $1,500.00 per month 
appellant won at trial in October 1988 is $600.00 a month. The 
petition for modification was filed in February of 1983. By the time 
Judge Sawaya denied Carol Brown's request for a retroactive award of 
child support, her petition had been pending for fifty six months. 
Fifty six months times six hundred dollars per month equals $33,600.00. 
Carol Brown didn't know how much of an increase the court would 
award her, but it was expected it would be substantial because her 
former husband's income had doubled, while hers stayed relatively low. 
It was anticipated that the request for a retroactive award would give 
rise to a substantial issue. 
Rule 52B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "In 
all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially . . ." Rule 52 further 
makes it clear that "requests for findings are not necessary for 
purposes of review." Judge Sawaya made no finding on this important 
issue (see Adendum A). 
In 1977, the Utah Legislature enacted §30-3-10.6 U. C. A. It 
became effective January 19, 1988. It states: 
"A child or spousal support payment under a child support 
order may be modified with respect to any period during 
which a petition for modification is pending, but only 
from the date notice of that petition was given ..." 
This statutory provision allowing a retroactive award is designed to 
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allow the trial court to get at fairness, and to eliminate, as much as 
possible, the unfair effects of delay in divorce modification 
litigation. The premise is that if a change is warranted under a 
petition for modification, that change should be effective as of the 
date both sides were aware of the change in the fact situation that 
warranted it. To make one party or the other live with an order, which 
that party later demonstrates needed to be changed earlier, without 
relief, encourages the party responding to the litigation to delay and 
punishes the petitioner unnecessarily. 
Generally speaking, appellant asserts that it should be, and 
is, the policy of the court to give retroactive relief. Judge Sawaya, 
however, refused to do so. Appellant asks herself, "why?" The only 
answer that can be given is, "We do not know." "The Judge made no 
finding which would explain." 
Judge Sawaya did find that: 
"The changes of circumstances are twofold, in that 
the plaintiff is now employed, earning approximately 
$14,000.00 per year annually, whereas at the time t h e 
decree was entered, she was unemployed, having no income. 
As a further change of circumstances, the court finds 
that the defendant personally has income potential 
exceeding $100,000.00 annually, whereas his income 
potential at the time of the decree was approximately 
$70,000.00 per year." [MEMORANDUM DECISION ADDENDUM 
A] 
If there was some reason the court felt Carol Brown was not 
deserving of a retroactive award, we can't tell what it was. If the 
lower court felt that it would be unfairly burdensome to Dr. Brown to 
pay a retroactive child support increase, we don't know why. We can 
only speculate as to why Judge Sawaya made the order he did. It is 
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clear that Judge Sawaya was obligated to make a finding on substantial 
issues, that this issue involving $3 3,600.00 was substantial, and that 
Judge Sawaya made no finding concerning it. 
The judgment below should at least be reversed as to the 
decision to deny retroactive relief on the child support issue for the 
entry of findings by Judge Sawaya and reconsideration in light of this 
courts opinion. Appellant requests that this court reverse and award 
judgment against respondent for $33,600.00 plus interest at 12% since 
the date of trial. 
ISSUE TWO 
DID THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL SUPPORT THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT TO DENY 
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE INCREASE IN CHILD SUPPORT 
HE HAD JUST AWARDED ? 
Carol Brown asserts thcit the preponderance of the evidence 
presented at trial did not support Judge Sawaya1s decision. 
Utah case law makes it clear that the appellant bears the burden 
of showing this court, based on the record, that the evidence does not 
support the judgement,if it is her claim that it does not. 
A brief review of the trial transcript becomes unavoidable. 
Charyce Brown was the first witness. She is the daughter of the 
parties. She was twelve when the petition was filed, but was eighteen 
and in college at B.Y.U. by the time of trial. She testified briefly 
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about which parent she planed to live with when not is school, and 
whether or not she wanted the child support paid for her by her father 
paid directly to her or through her mother [t2-8]. She testified that 
she considered her mother's house her permanent address, but that she 
wanted to feel free to live with either parent. She also said she 
didn't care how child support was paid, directly to her or through her 
mother. 
The next witness called was the appellant Carol Brown. She 
testified that she had married Dr. Brown when she was twenty two, had 
worked a year and a half when first married. She said that she had 
been a homemaker during the rest of their ten and one half year 
marriage [tl2]. She said that her husband had worked at J.C.Penneys 
one year, but otherwise was in school most of the time they were 
married. The parties got divorced while Dr. Brown was in his first year 
of practice as an obstetrician/gynecologist [tl3]. It was in his first 
year of private practice that Dr. Brown earned the $70,000.00 plus that 
the court found to be his income at the time of the divorce [tl4]. 
Carol further said that the parties had three children born 
during the marriage who were ages three, six, and nine at the time of 
the divorce [tl5]. She stated that at the time of the decree she 
received child support and alimony which totaled $1,800.00 a month and 
that she had no other income. Carol further testified that she had not 
remarried since the divorce or cohabitated with any adult male. She 
also stated that Dr. Brown had married shortly after their divorce 
[tl8]. She said that she had no other income than child support and 
alimony in 1980, and 1981. She also testified that she had income of 
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her own in 1982 beyond child support and alimony in the amount of 
$1,018.08 [tl9]. Carol stated that she couldn't remember if she had 
income in 1983 beyond alimony and child support. She had tried selling 
real estate that year but had been unsuccessful. She also said that 
in 1984 she had tried selling Herbalife, but that she had only earned 
a couple hundred of dollars in all of 1984. Carol said she had 
$1,929.00 income in 1985 [t20]. 
Carol testified that she had a college degree, but that the 
amount of retraining necessary to obtain a teaching certificate was 
prohibitive in terms of time and expense. She also said that after 
extensive interviewing, she decided to take a job at Eastern Airlines 
and worked there all through 1986. Carol earned $12,996.88 in 1986. 
Carol also worked for Eastern Airlines in 1987 and had an income of 
$14,720.00 [t24]. 
Carol then testified concerning her expenses as itemized on a 
financial declaration which was dated October 10, 1988 which showed 
her gross monthly income, at the time of trial, at $1,077.29. She also 
was then receiving child support and alimony totaling $1,800.00. Her 
further testimony was that including alimony and child support, but 
with taxes taken out of her personal income, she had net pay of 
$2,692.00 per month [t27]. Carol testified concerning her various 
monthly expenses including maintenance on her home, which she described 
as being in a state of considerable disrepair. She described large 
windows in her house being cracked, carpet being more than eighteen 
years old, a broken toilet, among other things [t35]. She testified 
that she wanted to save some money to buy a new car. She was driving 
15 
a 1980 Buick with 108,000 miles on it. Carol's testimony was that her 
total expenses a month were $1,100.00 in excess of her net income 
including alimony and child support [t39]. Carol testified that she 
owned no motor vehicles other than her car; no camper, trailer, boat, 
motorcycle, snowmobile, airplane, or any interest in any real estate 
other than her house. She also stated that she would have filed her 
petition for modification earlier than 1983, but believed that a 
provision in her decree which barred any petition to modify for three 
years would not allow it. Carol further stated that she had no stocks, 
bonds, certificates of deposit, retirement benefits, IRAs or Keoghs 
[t38]. 
Carol also testified that because she was employed by Eastern 
Airlines she had the opportunity to fly at highly discounted rates. 
For example she stated that she could fly anywhere in the United States 
for $6.00 one way. She also stated that she could fly outside the 
United States anywhere Eastern flew for $22.00 one way. She also said 
that tremendous discounts on lodging were available to her through her 
connections in the travel industry as an airline employee. She said 
that she had taken as much advantage of that opportunity for travel as 
she could. She further testified that she had worked holidays and 
weekends to make up days she missed while traveling [t44-46]. 
Carol Brown's tax returns for the years in question were 
offered as evidence, and admitted. Calculations based on the 
Governor's Task Force on Child Support worksheet and schedules showing 
what an appropriate amount of child support would be, based on the 
incomes of the parties was offered, and admitted by the court, as 
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advisory and illustrative of the appellant's theory of the case [t51]. 
Mr. Dart cross examined both Charyce Brown and Carol Brown at 
the conclusion of their testimony under direct examination. The cross 
examination generated more heat than light. 
The next witness who testified was Christi Farnsworth, a 
vocational specialist. She testified that anybody with a bachelor's 
degree, even if age 41 and out of the work force fifteen years, could 
get a full time job paying $20,000.00 within ninety days. She also 
testified that she had never met, spoken to, or interviewed Carol 
Brown, and knew nothing about her [t95-97]. 
Dr. Brown was next called to the stand. Dr. Brown was shown 
his individual tax returns for 1980 through and including 1987. With 
regard to each tax return, Dr. Brown stated that the return he was 
shown in court was a true and accurate copy of an original that he had 
filed with the IRS for the year indicated, and that he had signed the 
original. For those years during which Dr. Brown was remarried, he 
also identified the fact that his new wife's income was included in the 
return, and that she had also signed the original return. The exhibits 
representing Dr. Brown's tax returns for 1980 through 1987 were all 
admitted in evidence. Dr. Brown testified, while having the tax return 
exhibits in his hands, that his personal income (not including his new 
wife's) had been as follows: 
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1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
$81,500.00 
87,744.27 
98,550.00 
144,600.00 
132,799.16 
123,550.00 
70,750.00 
165,500.00 
Dr. Brown testified that with regard to each of the years 1980 
through 1987 he had also put monies in his corporate pension and profit 
sharing plan, which monies were not included in the income figures in 
his tax returns. The only exception to this was 1986, a year in which 
he had made no contribution to his pension and profit sharing plan. 
Dr. Brown was then shown plaintiff's exhibit 15, which he identified 
as a summary of contributions he had made to his pension and profit 
sharing plan each year for the years 1980 through 1987. Dr. Brown 
indicated that the exhibit was a true and accurate summary of the 
contributions he had made to his pension and profit sharing plan for 
those years. Dr. Brown stated that only a portion of the money placed 
in his pension and profit sharing plan each year was attributable to. 
This is because there were other employees of his professional 
corporation who also participated in his pension and profit sharing 
plan. Dr. Brown testified that the following amounts contributed each 
year to the plan were directly attributable to him for his benefit and 
not his employees: 
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1980 $15,260.00 
1981 21,936.06 
1982 24,637.50 
1983 16,028.36 
1984 13,279.92 
1985 12,335.00 
1986 no contribution 
1987 25,120.73 
In addition to the income listed on his tax returns, and the 
monies put aside in his pension and profit sharing plan listed above, 
Dr. Brown stated that his new wife, Franc Brown, earned an average of 
approximately $2 0,000.00 a year. 
Dr. Brown was next shown plaintiff's exhibit 22, which he 
identified as a record of his new families1 expenditures, which he had 
personally produced on a home computer. Dr. Brown testified that 
exhibit was a true and accurate listing of all his expenditures for 
1987, and that he had expended in his household in 1987 a total of 
$164,223.83. Dr. Brown testified that he owned a twenty six foot 1988 
sea ray boat, had traveled abroad and in the United States with his 
family on vacations since the divorce [tll9]. He said that he lived 
in a house which he had paid $168,000.00 for, and had done $15,000.00 
worth of improvements to it. Since his divorce Dr. Brown had been a 
partner in a business known as Trekker Aeronautics, which had owned a 
Beachcraft Bonanza airplane. His partner in the airplane business had 
been his second wife, Frankie. He had taken training in the plane to 
become a pilot, but later sold the plane and dissolved Trekker 
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Aeronautics [tl24]. Mr. Dart cross examined Dr. Brown and pointed out 
that it had been eight years since the divorce, and that Dr., Brown had 
paid his alimony of $900.00 a month faithfully for those eight years. 
Dr. Brown was asked whether he believed he had paid alimony long 
enough, and he indicated that he believed that he did. Dr. Brown also 
testified that he believed he should be allowed to pay his older 
child's, Charyce, child support directly to her and not through his 
former wife. The remaining portion of Dr. Brown's redirect and recross 
examination concerned Dr. Brown's request for extended visitation with 
his children. 
Dr. Brown then testified that he had been paid as personal 
income $144,000.00 in the first ten and one half months of 1988 up 
until the time of trial. He also said that he anticipated that his 
income for that year would be $160,000.00. He also stated that he had 
made a total contribution for himself and his employees in the pension 
and profit sharing plan for 1988 in the amount of $30,000.00 [tl44]. 
Dr. Brown stated that he was willing to have the court increase his 
child support obligation from $300.00 per child per month to $500.00 
per child per month. 
This just happened to be exactly the same amount of money in 
child support as was contained in the stipulation which Judge Sawaya 
had earlier ruled Carol Brown was stuck with. It was Judge Sawaya's 
decision to enforce that stipulation on Carol, which resulted in her 
prior appeal in this case to this court and reversal of Judge Sawaya's 
order. It seems to the appellant to be more than coincidental that 
Judge Sawaya, was reversed, then later at trial, when evidence was 
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presented that the child support should be $1,600.00 to $1,700.00 per 
month based on the charts, that Judge Sawaya then, when Dr. Brown's 
income was "off the charts", awarded after trial only $1,500.00 a month 
for child support. This is exactly the same amount she would have 
gotten under the terms of the stipulation he enforced against her, but 
was reversed on. Not a single piece of evidence presented at trial 
suggested that $1,500.00 was an appropriate amount to increase child 
support to. 
Appellant believes that Judge Sawaya intends to teach her 
a lesson, the lesson being that it will not benefit her to appeal his 
decisions. She feels that Judge Sawaya has punished her for appealing 
his order and getting him reversed. 
Carol Brown, however, does not appeal the amount of the child 
support award. In the instant case, Judge Sawaya refused, without 
findings, to give Carol Brown any retroactive affect to her newly won 
increases in child support. In the five and one half years it took her 
to get from petition through an appeal and complete a trial, her 
children had gone from ages six, nine, and twelve to ages eleven, 
fourteen, and eighteen. She and her children had gone without the 
benefits of an increase in child support for five and one half years. 
The evidence presented at the time of trial clearly demonstrated that 
both the appellant, and her children, had been entitled to at least the 
increase they were eventually awarded from the day they filed their 
petition. The only reason Carol Brown did not obtain the increases 
sooner was that she could not get to trial sooner. It was not her 
fault that she had to appeal Judge Sawaya's interim decision and get 
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him reversed to get back on track to trial (a process which consumed 
nearly two and one half years). Dr. Brown's financial position was 
substantial and extensive discovery had to be done, both pre and post 
appeal because of the changes which had occurred during the interim 
period. It was obvious from the evidence that she and the children had 
needed the money during the entire five and one half years so as to 
allow the children to live a life style somewhat like their father's 
new family enjoyed. It is clear from Carol's testimony that the 
appellant and her children did not have that kind of money and did not 
have that kind of life style. 
It may be argued by the respondent, that to grant appellant 
retroactive increases is to grant the appellant a windfall. Appellant, 
however, points out that to fail to grant her retroactive application 
of her increase in child support is to allow the respondent, Dr. Brown, 
a windfall. The difference is, that Carol Brown still has children at 
home. She has a daughter in college whom she cannot afford to assist 
financially. She spent five and one half years struggling with her 
children, through comparatively hard financial times. During that five 
and one half years her former husband could offer the children the sun, 
moon, and stars financially, and did. She, on the other hand, was the 
comparatively poor custodial parent who couldn't compete with her 
husband's ability to buy the children's attention and affection. Giving 
her the money now will help the children at home and Charyce in 
college, and Dr. Brown can afford to pay it. 
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CONCLUSION 
The court below committed reversible error when it failed to 
make any finding whatsoever concerning Carol Brown's request that the 
increase in child support prayed for in her petition for modification 
be made retroactive to the date of filing. Based on the court's final 
award, increasing the respondent's child support obligation to 
$1,500.00 per month, and considering the fifty six month period it took 
to litigate the matter, the retroactive award issue was a $33,600.00 
issue. Such substantial issues must be supported by findings. The 
decision of the lower court to deny appellant any retroactive award for 
child support should be reversed. The appellant should be awarded 
judgment against the respondant for $33,600.00 plus interest at the 
rate of 12% per anum on said amount from the date of trial, plus costs 
of court. 
The preponderance of the credible evidence, and in fact, the 
uncontroverted evidence presented at trial, was to the effect that 
Dr. Brown's income had roughly doubled, typically exceeding $100,000.00 
per year, and that this had been true since 1982. Carol Brown, on the 
other hand, had no income at the time of the divorce and has not earned 
more than $15,000.00 in a year since. All the evidence concerning 
expenses of the parties showed that they had lived a life style 
consistent with their income. Using the income figures of the parties 
to calculate a child support obligation for Dr. Brown indicated that 
a substantial increase in child support was warranted, and had been 
warranted since 1982. Not a shred of evidence was produced at the time 
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of trial in support of any claim by Dr. Brown that a retroactive child 
support award should not be made other than the claim that such an 
award would be a windfall to the appellant. 
The decision of the court below to deny Carol Brown a 
retroactive application of the child support increase awarded her 
should be reversed as not supported by the weight of the evidence, and 
this court should enter judgment in favor of Carol Brown for $33,600.00 
plus interest from the date of the lower court's decision at the 
judgment rate until paid, plus costs.. 
Respectfully submitted, 
David A. McPhie 
Counsel for the Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing appellant's brief to attorney for respondent, 
B.L. Dart, at 310 S. Main Street, #1330, Salt Lake City, Uj£ah, on this 
day of June, 1989. ^\ . "X 
David A. McPhie 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRYANT JEROME BROWN, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. D-79-3802 
The matter of the plaintiff's Petition and the defendant's 
counter Petition for Modification of the Decree of Divorce 
entered in this matter came on regularly for trial before the 
Court on the 18th day of October, 1988. The parties were present 
with counsel. David A. McPhie, Esq. appeared on behalf of the 
plaintiff and the petitioner, Bert L. Dart, Esq. appeared on 
behalf of the defendant and counter-petitioner. The matters of 
the Petition and counter Petition were fully presented, argued 
and submitted, and the Court's decision thereon taken under 
advisement. The Court having now fully considered the pleadings, 
exhibits, authorities and Memoranda of the parties, now makes its 
ruling and decision thereon as follows. 
The Court finds that there has been a material change of 
circumstances since entry of the original Decree of Divorce in 
this matter. That the changes of circumstances are two-fold in 
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that the plaintiff is now employed, earning approximately 
$14,000.00 annually, whereas at the time the Decree was entered 
she was unemployed, having no income. As a further change of 
circumstances the Court finds that defendant personally has 
income potential exceeding $100,000.00 annually, whereas his 
income and potential at the time of the Decree was approximately 
$70,000.00 per year. 
Based upon the foregoing finding of a change in 
circumstances, the Court will enter the following Order: 
1. That alimony previously ordered in the sum of $900.00 
per month continue at that rate, and that it terminate at the 
time that the youngest child of the parties attains the age of 
majority. 
2. That child support be increased from the sum of $300.00 
per month, per child to the sum of $500.00 per month, per child. 
Child support for the oldest child, Charisse, shall be paid 
directly to her, since she has attained the age of majority. 
That child support for any child attaining the age of majority be 
paid directly to that child pursuant to the provisions of the 
original Decree providing for continued child support to any 
child of the parties to age 21 if that child elects to serve a 
mission for the L.D.S. Church, or shall elect to attend a college 
or university. 
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3. Plaintiffs Petition for increased child support 
retroactive to the date of filing her Petition is denied. 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees in 
the sum of $5,000.00, which sum the Court determines to be 
reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this proceeding, 
together with her costs reasonably incurred in processing and 
proceeding with her Petition. 
5. Defendant's counter Petition seeking increased 
visitation is granted to allow defendant a period of six weeks 
during the summer months for visitation with the minor children. 
Only, however, based upon the same terms and conditions as in the 
original Decree provided. The Court has reviewed the visitation 
provision of the original Decree, and finds it in all other 
respects to be fair and reasonable, and no modification other 
than indicated will be made. 
Plaintiff's counsel is requested to prepare and submit the 
appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of 
modification as above-indicated. 
Dated this 27th day of October, 1988. 
JAMES S. 'SAW&YA 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this day of October, 1988: 
David A. McPhie 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3450 S. Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
B. L. Dart 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 S. Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Carol Ann Barker Brown, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Bryant Jerome Brown, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood and Orme. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
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DAVIDSON, Judge: Timothy M. Shea ClerK of the Court 
Utah Ccjrt of Appeals 
Plaintiff appeals from an order relative to the 
modification of a decree of divorce which treated a putative 
stipulation as dispositive of all issues. We reverse and remand, 
The parties were married on June 4, 1969. Three children 
were born to the Browns; all of whom are still minors at the 
time of this appeal. Defendant is a physician with a practice 
located in Salt Lake City. Plaintiff possesses a bachelor's 
degree and was not employed at the time of divorce. The amended 
decree of divorce was signed on February 21, 1980. The salient 
provisions were: plaintiff would have custody of the children 
subject to specified visitation rights; defendant would pay 
child support in the amount of $300.00 per child per month for a 
total of $900.00 per month; defendant would pay $900.00 per 
month as alimony which would cease if plaintiff remarried or 
cohabited with a male; and plaintiff would not be able to seek 
an increase in support or alimony for 36 months after the date 
of the decree. 
On March 1, 1983, plaintiff filed a petition for 
modification of the decree of divorce which was based on a 
significant increase in defendant's gross income and a material 
change in plaintiff's circumstances. The two most important 
requests for modification were for increases in alimony and 
child support to $1,500.00 per month and $500.00 per child per 
month, respectively. Defendant counterpetitioned for 
termination of alimony and for expanded visitation rights. 
During the next fifteen months discovery and settlement 
negotiations took place. Plaintiff's deposition was scheduled 
for June 5# 1984, in preparation for a trial set for August 14, 
1984, Apparently plaintiff's counsel caused opposing counsel to 
believe that the issues had been resolved satisfactorily and that 
the time scheduled for the taking of plaintiff's deposition could 
be used to record the agreement. The parties and their 
respective counsel met on the scheduled date and recorded the 
agreement at issue before a certified shorthand reporter. In 
addition to visitation arrangements/ the agreement provided that/ 
commencing July 1984, alimony would be reduced from $900.00 per 
month to $500.00 per month and would continue for two years at 
the lower level before terminating. Child support was increased 
from $300.00 per child per month to $500.00 per child per month 
with conditions specified when such support would also 
terminate. The record indicates that both counsel and defendant 
spoke but that plaintiff said nothing during the proceedings. 
The agreement was subsequently reduced to writing and sent to 
plaintiff's counsel. Beginning in July 1984/ defendant began 
paying the total amount set forth in the agreement/ which 
payments were accepted by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff contends that she was not given a copy of the 
written agreement until August 1984. She immediately attempted 
to consult with her counsel but was unable to see him until late 
in September. At that meeting/ plaintiff stated that she 
believed the agreement to be unfair and refused to sign it. Her 
counsel withdrew on November 1, 1984. 
On February 14/ 1985/ defendant filed a motion for an order 
approving and enforcing the settlement agreement. On February 
25/ 1985/ plaintiff filed an affidavit which stated that her 
former counsel had assured her that increases in alimony and 
child support were justified and that he was confident she would 
win major increases in both; that she was unaware of the tenor of 
the proposed settlement agreement until the day scheduled for her 
deposition; that her former counsel informed her that he told 
opposing counsel that she would agree to the settlement; that she 
was "shocked/ dismayed/ dissapointed [sic]/ and confused" by her 
counsel's change in position; that she didn't recall speaking at 
the proceeding; and that she refused to sign the written 
agreement. A hearing on defendant's motion was held before the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner in March 1985/ who recommended 
that the motion be granted. Plaintiff rejected the 
recommendation and the motion was argued in Third District Court 
in April. The order enforcing the agreement was filed on May 1/ 
1985/ and plaintiff timely filed her notice of appeal. The issue 
is whether or not the trial court should have accepted and 
enforced the proceedings of June 5/ 1984/ as a stipulation 
between the parties. 
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It is necessary to begin by looking at what constitutes a 
"stipulation". 
A promise or agreement with reference to a 
pending judicial proceeding, made by a party 
to the proceeding or his attorney, is 
binding without consideration. By statute 
or rule of court such an agreement is 
generally binding only (a) if it is in 
writing and signed by the party or attorney, 
or (b) if it is made or admitted in the 
presence of the court, or (c) to the extent 
that justice requires enforcement in view of 
material change of position in reliance on 
the promise or agreement. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 94 (1981). 
Further, 
It has been said that unless it is clear 
from the record that the parties assented, 
there is no stipulation, and it is provided 
in many jurisdictions, by rule of court or 
by statute, that a private agreement or 
consent between the parties or their 
attorneys, in respect to the proceedings in 
a cause, will not be enforced by the court 
unless it is evidenced by a writing 
subscribed by the party against whom it is 
alleged or made, and filed by the clerk or 
entered upon the minutes of the court. Any 
other rule would require the court to pass 
upon the credibility of the attorneys. 
73 Am. Jur. 2d Stipulations § 2 (1974) (footnote 
omitted). 
Utah R. Prac. D. & C. Ct. 4.5(b) requires that H[n]o orders, 
judgments or decrees upon stipulation shall be signed or entered 
unless such stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of 
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk, 
provided that the stipulation may be made orally in open court.M 
There can be little doubt the rule of practice is concerned with 
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds as expressed in Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1984)* which states that certain agreements 
1. § 25-5-4: Certain agreements void unless written and 
subscribed. In the following cases every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, 
is in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be 
performed within one year from the making thereof. 
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are void unless in writing and subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith. The Statute of Frauds was not interposed as 
an affirmative defense below.2 
Basic to a valid stipulation is a meeting of the minds of 
those involved. The parties must have completed their 
negotiations either in person or through their attorneys acting 
within the rules of agency. The agreement then is reduced to 
writing, signed and filed with the clerk or read into the record 
before the court. This procedure would indicate obvious assent 
to the provisions of the agreement so stipulated. Not so here. 
This agreement was reached between one of the parties and 
both counsel. Mrs. Brown remained silent while it was discussed 
and read into the record. The proceeding was not done in court 
as would be permitted by Rule 4.5(b) but was done at the time of 
a deposition before a shorthand reporter. Had it been done in 
court a judge would have been involved and would have made 
inquiry of the parties, likely while they were both under oath, 
if they understood and agreed with the terms. Had Mrs. Brown 
remained silent in that scenario it is hard to imagine the court 
finding agreement. The same conclusion is compelled here. 
Silence cannot be construed to be assent in these circumstances. 
For a stipulation to be binding, agreement by the parties must be 
evidenced by a signed writing which would satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds, or the agreement must be stated in court on the record 
before a judge. The facts in this case do not show such 
evidence. Therefore, there was no stipulation reached between 
the parties and there is nothing for the court to enforce. 
Defendant argues that plaintiff made no timely objection to 
the agreement and accepted the additional $200.00 per month from 
him; thus she should be estopped from denying its validity. It 
is easily understood why plaintiff accepted the increased 
payments. She was confused as to her position, unsure of what 
her counsel might do next, and the payments appear to have been 
her sole means of support. Any refusal to accept might have 
resulted in a delay or cessation of support or increased delays 
in determining the status of defendant's obligations. We have 
already discussed the time delays plaintiff experienced in 
obtaining an appointment with her counsel after she first read 
the written agreement. These facts are insufficient to impute a 
timeliness issue in accordance with Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 
476 (Utah 1975). Neither do these facts give rise to estoppel. 
2. Certainly a stipulation setting terms for payment of alimony 
and child support would fall within the Statute of Frauds since 
such an agreement would not be performed within one year from 
the making. The putative stipulation here would run for many 
years with changes to occur at stated intervals. 
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We will not go around the Statute of Frauds and Rule 4.5(b) to 
create a stipulation on the mere acceptance of $200,00 per month 
by plaintiff.3 Whether she is entitled to retain the extra 
payments or will be required to credit defendant shall be 
determined by the trial court on remand. 
In summary, we hold that the putative stipulation of June 5, 
1984, fails to meet the requirements of a valid stipulation as 
stated above. The order enforcing the agreement is reversed and 
the case is remanded to the trial court for further action on 
plaintiff's original petition for modification. Costs against 
defendant. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
ORME, Judge: (dissenting) 
I think what is said in the main opinion about the 
requirements for a binding stipulation is correct. I agree the 
requirements for a valid stipulation were not met in this case. 
However, there are situations where a settlement agreement is 
reached—where all parties have had a meeting of the minds as to 
the basis for settlement of an action or proceeding—through a 
device other than a stipulation. That agreement might be 
memorialized by an exchange of letters, dictation to a shorthand 
reporter, or even just a handshake. In my view, such agreements, 
intended to be binding when made, are enforceable and should be 
enforced. They should be enforced even though one party might 
have a change of heart or otherwise balk at signing a formal 
stipulation designed to implement the valid and binding agreement 
previously made. Parties have no right to welch on a settlement 
deal during the sometimes substantial period between when the 
deal is struck and when all necessary signatures can be garnered 
on a stipulation. 
3. The evidence shows this defendant to be earning a 
substantial income. The additional $200.00 per month paid on 
this putative stipulation represents no hardship and no material 
change of circumstances on his part. 
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The key in this case, then, is whether appellant assented to 
the settlement agreement which was dictated to the reporter in 
her presence. She concededly sat mute throughout the 
proceeding. Her duly employed attorney, however, manifested 
assent on her behalf. The pivotal issue is whether he had 
authority to do so. 
The facts are in conflict on this point. Appellant suggests 
she was stupefied by her former attorney's betrayal and rendered 
unable to speak or, apparently, even to storm out. On the other 
hand, it is reasonable to infer, as those present did, that a 
principal who says nothing when her agent speaks for her is in 
accord with the sentiments expressed by the agent. This 
inference is bolstered by evidence which is usually quite 
reliable—the subsequent course of conduct of the parties. 
Following the apparent agreement, respondent made payment at the 
higher level contemplated by the putative settlement and for 
several months appellant accepted those payments without 
incident. No unfavorable inference would be available from her 
merely cashing the checks, which were mostly for amounts clearly 
due her. But her retention and use of the extra amount not due 
her under the original decree is consistent only with an 
understanding that a settlement had been reached—or, I suppose, 
of dishonesty on her part. Laypersons fully understand that they 
may spend money only if it is theirs. There being nothing to 
suggest appellant was dishonest, the fact that she kept the extra 
amount rather than returning it tends to show she thought it was 
hers to keep; it could be hers to keep only if the decree were 
modified, as per the settlement, to increase the monthly total 
due for her support and that of the children. Thus, her 
retention and use of the larger payments tendered subsequent to 
the alleged settlement tends to show she had agreed to the terms 
of the settlement. 
The facts concerning whether appellant assented to the 
settlement would support a conclusion either way. After hearing 
the motion to enforce the settlement, which a commissioner 
earlier heard and recommended be granted, the trial court made 
findings of fact to the effect that appellant was bound by the 
settlement. I concede, however, that those findings are not 
entitled to the usual deference because the court did not receive 
actual testimony. ££. Diversified Equities. Inc. v. American 
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Savings & Loan, 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).* The 
court received affidavits and counsels1 representations about 
what the testimony would show. Thus, the trial court's usual 
advantage in terms of viewing the witnesses and their demeanor 
does not obtain in this case. We are in as good a position to 
review the affidavits and consider the proffer2 as was the 
1. In Diversified Equities, the trial court received an 
extensive recitation of facts to which the parties had 
stipulated. 739 P.2d at 1134. The trial court then entered 
MfindingsM of fact. We observed: "Generally/ a trial court's 
findings of fact are accorded great deference. However, without 
regard to the labels used, when those "findings- proceed from 
stipulated facts . . . the "findings" are tantamount to 
conclusions of law, with *he stipulation of facts being the 
functional equivalent of the findings of fact." 739 P.2d at 
1136. That conclusion is premised on two factors: First, a 
disposition based on stipulated facts is "not one involving 
resolution by the trial court of conflicting testimony." 
Schroeder v. Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. 1979) (en banc). 
Second, since the facts are written or recited and do not turn 
on witness credibility, an appellate court has "the same means 
as the trial court had of reaching a correct conclusion of 
law . . . ." Stiles v. Brown. 380 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Ala. 
1980). Those same factors apply to the affidavits and proffer 
which substituted for testimony in the instant case. Although 
the conflict between the affidavits should have prompted an 
evidentiary hearing, see Note 3, infra, we are in as good a 
position as was the trial court to read the affidavits and the 
proffer and draw logical conclusions therefrom. 
2. Fortunately, one of the two attorneys requested that the 
hearing be reported or the proffer would be unavailable to us. 
Such a hearing should be reported as a matter of course. See 
Brioos v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(••Although consistently making a record of all proceedings 
imposes a greater burden on the trial court and court reporters, 
it is impossible for an appellate court to review what may 
ultimately prove to be important proceedings when no record of 
them has been made."). 
860125-CA 7 
trial court.3 After considering these items, I agree with the 
commissioner and the trial judge that the facts more readily 
support the conclusion that appellant initially agreed to the 
settlement and then had a change of heart than the conclusion 
that she never agreed but was rendered unable to say so and 
simply regarded the extra amounts tendered as a coincidental gift 
from her ex-husband. 
I would affirm. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
3. In retrospect, an evidentiary hearing would probably have 
been preferable. Had the testimony been consistent with the 
affidavits and proffer and the same findings made, those findings 
would clearly be entitled to the usual deference and the trial 
court's disposition would clearly be entitled to affirmance. 
However, neither side requested an evidentiary hearing and 
appellant does not argue on appeal that she was entitled to one. 
860125-CA 8 
